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The EU CO2 emissions trading scheme was inspired by successful cap and trade programs 
for SO2 and NOx in the US. Most US programs allocated allowances to large emitters 
based on a historic base line for a period of up to thirty years. The National Allocation 
Plans in Europe deviate from this principle and allocates allowances in an iterative 
approach first for a three then for a five-year period. The potential updating of the base 
line creates perverse incentives for operation and investment. Most National Allocation 
Plans also reserve allowances for new entrants further distorting the scheme. We use 
analytic models and a numeric simulation for the UK power sector to illustrate and 
quantify how these effects contribute to an inflation of the allowance price while reducing 
utilisation and investment in efficient technologies. The inflated allowance prices are likely 
to increase the European allowance budget and emissions, e.g. through the Linking 
Directive. As a result opportunity costs of emitting CO2 are reduced relative to an efficient 
cap and trade program.  
1.  Introduction 
The European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU Directive 2003/87/EC) aims to control CO2 
emissions from power generation and heavy industry in the context of countries’ Kyoto Protocol 
targets. It started operating on 1st January 2005.  This is based on the cap-and-trade model following 
successful experience with similar programmes for SO2 and NOx emissions in the US (Ellerman et. al. 
2000). The annual market value of the total allowances issued at current trading prices (June 2005) is 
€40bn, making it by far the world’s largest environmental management programme. Emission 
allowances are allocated to installations in the power, ceramics, metal, paper and cement industries 
and any other large combustion plant with a rated thermal capacity above 20MW, comprising in total 
about half of EU CO2 emissions, of which two-thirds is from power generation. Installations can trade 
these allowances but at the end of each year must hold enough allowances to cover each (metric) tonne 
of carbon dioxide (tCO2) emitted.  
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EU Member States are required to allocate emission allowances to participating facilities in 
sequential periods. The first phase, 2005-07, is precursor to the second, which coincides with the 
Kyoto Protocol’s First Commitment Period (CP1) of 2008-12.  National governments have retained 
some allowances, which will be either allocated to new entrants or auctioned to market participants. 
Member States are allowed to auction up to 5% and 10% of the total allowances issued respectively in 
the first two periods; the rest must be allocated for free. The final allocation plans for the first period 
were agreed with the European Commission in spring 2005. Allocation plans for the Kyoto period are 
due to be agreed for the Kyoto period during 2006. 
While member states are obliged to adhere to the allocation plans they submitted to the 
commission, the total amount of national emissions for the present period are not legally constrained: 
EU Member States are meant to be on a pathway towards achieving the agreed Kyoto emission 
reductions for 2008-12.  Member States retain discretion over how many of their emission reductions 
they expect to achieve in the sectors covered by the EU ETS, as compared to the remaining sectors - 
mainly transport and heating – and by use of the Kyoto international mechanisms.  
 
 
Figure 1 Price at which emission allowances were traded in forward markets, Source: Evolution Markets. 
A forward market for EU Allowances has been developing. Figure 1 illustrates the price at 
which the forward markets priced allowances for the period 2005-2007. Prices have changed 
significantly, reflecting changes in market expectations of total allowances allocated to the covered 
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sectors. At recent trading prices exceeding €20/tCO2, the annual market value of the allowances 
exceeds €40bn.  
In principle, once allocations are known and fixed, subsequent trading should result in efficient 
abatement decisions that minimise the costs of meeting the Kyoto greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
reduction targets. Indeed in some respects, the EU ETS is close to an economist’s ideal structure for 
internalising a market externality with minimal competitive impacts. In other respects, however, it 
differs significantly from this ideal. The combination of large free allocations, flexibility over the 
allocation methodology, and separate negotiations for each five-year period, create risks of a 
substantial divergence from theoretical efficiency as well as room for dispute and distortion between 
different participants. This paper sets out the analytic fundamentals of how the real-world economics 
of the EU ETS may differ from the economists’ ideal, with particular reference to the power sector. 
In practice, electricity market structures in different EU countries vary considerably, and each 
country has leeway in defining how they allocate allowances to their industries. Both market and 
allocation realities differ from the theoretical ideal in several respects. We survey briefly how market 
structures may affect the pricing implications of the EU ETS and then focus on three allocation issues:  
• First, it is likely that today’s emissions could influence allocation of CO2 allowance in some 
future period. We will refer to this process as ‘updating’ of the base line that determines the 
allowance allocation. 
• Second, in many of the national allocation plans (NAPs) new entrants will be awarded 
allowances from a new entrant reserve, reducing the cost of new entry.  
• Third, the allocation to existing units in some countries is subject to minimum operating 
conditions, which encourages them to remain online thereby reducing the scarcity value of 
capacity.   
We use analytic models to assess the impact of these three issues in two-period and multi-period 
models for operation and investment. We obtain two robust results which we then quantify using an 
investment planning model. First, relative to an efficient allocation based on historic output or 
auctions, the updating mechanism inflates allowance prices. Secondly, if Linking Directive or other 
mechanisms increase the number of allowances in the system at higher allowance prices, then the 
opportunity cost of emitting CO2 is reduced relative to an efficient allocation using auctions or grand-
fathering.  
In section 2 we introduce the economics of allowances in the power sector. Section 3 analyses 
in the static case the impact of different allocation mechanisms on allowance price, emissions and 
power prices. Section 4 moves to the dynamic case assessing the impact on investment decisions of 
updating and new entrant allocation. The analytic results are summarised in section 5. Section 6 
provides numerical results for the various cases at the example of the UK power sector assuming a 
fixed allowance price. Section 7 discusses why the amount of allowances in the European system can 
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be a function of allowance price in contrast to the US situation with fixed caps4 and finally section 8 
concludes. 
2. The Economics of the EU ETS for the power sector: an overview 
Rent value of allocation and cost pass-through 
Toman et.al. (1998) show that under a scheme in which the baseline reference period remains 
unchanged (grandfathering), the scarcity rent of CO2 allowances is passed onto owners of generation 
assets.  Grandfathering emission certificates requires extensive information about past emissions and 
political negotiations on a number of issues including the treatment of new entrants (Harrison and 
Radov, 2002) and the split between different sectors (Sijm et. al.,2002).  Bode (2004) assesses the 
impacts of additional options for the design of national allocation plans – like using benchmark 
emission rates. Crampton and Kerr (2002) conclude that an auctioning of emissions certificates would 
avoid these problems.  The state government could use auction revenue to decrease distortionary taxes, 
compensate those sectors or consumers most impacted by price increase, or recycle the funds to other 
types of energy efficiency projects (Barker et. al.  1993, Zhang and Baranzini 2003).  
General equilibrium models show that the macroeconomic costs of the CO2 control program are 
significantly higher under grandfathering than when all allowances are auctioned and recycled through 
marginal personal income tax rate cuts (Smith and Ross, 2002). Burtraw et.al.  (2002) applied an 
investment planning model to the US electricity system and calculated that only 20.5% of allowances 
would have to be allocated for free to compensate generators for their increased costs – the remaining 
cost increase would be covered by an increase in wholesale prices. The remaining allowances could be 
allocated in an auction. However, it seems that the fraction of grandfathered allocations is determined 
in a political bargaining process (Bovenberg et. al 2003) to obtain the support for the scheme of the 
generation sector.  
Impact of CO2 opportunity costs on electricity prices 
Electricity demand changes over the day and year. Generation plants with high fixed costs and 
relatively low operating marginal costs, such as nuclear and run-of-river hydro, generate throughout 
the year. Units with lower fixed costs but higher operating marginal costs are used to provide 
electricity during shoulder and peak demand periods.  
Of particular interest for our study are pulverised coal-fired plants (PC) and natural gas-fired 
combined cycle gas turbine plants (CCGT). Variable costs of both plants are determined mainly by 
their marginal fuel costs. At present (June 2005), PC plants operate for more hours per year than 
                                                     
4 Even the US SO2 cap offered limited flexibility. In phase I some facilities could decide on a year by year basis 
whether they wanted to be covered by the emission trading scheme (opt in) or be exposed to traditional 
regulation. Only facilities that expected to require less allowances than allocated when opting in would do so. 
This has provided approximately 2-3% extra allowances to the remaining facilities (Ellerman, 2003).  
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CCGTs. However, the investment cost for new PC plants is almost twice that for CCGT.  Moreover, 
permitting processes tend to be more difficult for PC plant due to their larger environmental impact. 
As a result, most of the new power stations constructed over the past decade in Europe have been gas-
fired CCGT.  
Now the introduction of CO2 allowances will play a crucial role in determining the relative cost 
of these technologies. The CO2 emissions per MWh of electricity produced by a modern coal plant are 
more than twice as high as from combined cycle gas turbines, so a CO2 constraint increases PC’s costs 
more than CCGTs. 
In the short-term, electricity prices are set by the marginal unit. The marginal units tend to be 
those consuming fossil fuels, and as such are always exposed to CO2 allowance prices.  Therefore, the 
price of electricity can be expected to rise in all periods. However, if the marginal unit emits more CO2 
than an average unit then the electricity prices increase by the opportunity costs of CO2 emissions of 
the marginal unit which are above the average costs of CO2 allowances for the generation sector. In 
two cases this might not apply. First, if gas prices are high and gas-fired units set the price, then the 
electricity price will increase by the cost of CO2 allowances for gas-fired units which would be half the 
increase in cost for PC units. Second, if increases in electricity prices elicit a compensating demand 
response, then prices will also rise by less than the opportunity costs of the marginal unit. The latter is 
unlikely to be significant since electricity demand tends to be inelastic. 
The weight of these individual effects differs depending on fuel prices and generation mix. 
Burtraw calculates that for the US, 20.5% of allowances need to be allocated for free to ensure that 
firms will not incur losses due to the introduction of emission trading (2003) and similar numbers 
result from various studies for the ETS (Dinan, 2003, ILEX 2003, OXERA 2004, Keats and Neuhoff 
2004). 
Figure 2 shows results for a UK simulation assuming a fixed generation structure and cost 
factors as described in more detail in section 6. CO2 allowances increase the electricity cost for 
consumers (revenue for generators) independent of whether allowances are auctioned or grandfathered 
based on a historic base line.  
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Figure 2 UK simulation results (2005-2007) 
The increased revenue roughly compensates the generation sector for the cost it would incur if 
CO2 allowances were auctioned, but creates a windfall profit for generators if allowances are 
grandfathered. The CO2 emissions reductions are independent of the allocation mechanism. 
This analysis assumes a competitive market. If we assume that generators have market power in 
the wholesale market then they are likely to continue to pass through at least some of the opportunity 
costs. In a Cournot model the assumptions about demand determine whether strategic generators 
increase electricity prices by more or less than the increase in opportunity costs.5 Note that, if vertical 
integration persists and retail prices of the incumbent are regulated, then the regulator might not allow 
the full pass through of the opportunity cost of CO2.  
3. Static analysis of updating and banking, without investment 
In this section we formalise the main issues in evaluating the impacts and incentives associated 
with the EU ETS. 
                                                     
5 With linear demand, an increase in the opportunity cost decreases total demand and therefore the incentive to 
withhold output. Linear Cournot models suggest that strategic generators can only pass through part of any cost 
increase. In contrast, if we assume constant demand elasticity, then the oligopoly price will increase by more 
than the increase of opportunity costs. This can be shown as follows: 
Assume n generators, demand elasticity ε, marginal cost c and price P that ε/n=1-c/P. With a 10% increase of 
marginal costs c the price also has to increase by 10%, and therefore by more than marginal costs. Therefore 
constant demand elasticity implies an opportunity cost pass through of more than 100%. 
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We assume emissions E(c) to be a decreasing function in opportunity costs c of emitting CO2:6 
. 0)'( <cE
With updating, the opportunity costs ct of emitting CO2 is equal to the costs of allowances pt 
minus the value of free future allocation pt+1. For each unit of CO2 emissions today, assume that a firm 
receives only a fraction u of CO2 allowances in the next period. The price of future allowances is 
discounted by the factor β: 
1+−= ttt pupc β        (1) 
 
A(),A’≥0 Allowances provided to market pt Allowance price in period t 
E(),E’<0     Emissions at opportunity costs c ct Opportunity costs of emitting in t 
u Updating: fraction of emission in 
t allocated for free in t+1 
β Discount factor β=1/(1+r) 
pelec,t Electricity price in t λ Emissions/unit electricity  
Μ Free allowances allocated to new 
entrant 
D(pelec) Electricity demand at price pelec
cf Fixed (investment) costs for 
entry 
μ Number of allowances for the new 
entrants 
Ki Installed capacity of type i cm,i Marginal cost for type i 
Table 1 Symbols used in analysis 
3.1 Introduction of updating together with trading  
Prior to 2005, there was no constraint on CO2 emissions (pt=0) but it could have been possible 
that emission levels in 2004 would have influenced the allowance allocation for the first Kyoto 
commitment period (2008-2012).  Any expectation that increased 2004 emissions would result in 
increased allocation (updating, u>0) creates a negative opportunity cost of emitting CO2 (ct<0). For 
illustration, if companies in 2004 assumed that an updating factor of u=0.7 would be applied with 0.5 
probability, with a discount factor of ß=0.9 over 5 years and expect a CO2 allowance price of 
20€/tCO2 for 2008, then the opportunity costs of emitting CO2 in 2004 were 
 
c2004  = p2004 – u* ß* p2008 =0  - 0.5 * 0.7* 0.95 *  20€/t=-4.1€/t (2) 
 
                                                     
6 In a competitive market, firms set output such that price equals marginal production costs. Demand decreases 
with increasing production costs and firms might operate less carbon intensive technologies when opportunity 
costs of CO2 emissions are higher. 
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Under these assumptions, the opportunity costs of emitting CO2 in 2004 would have been 
negative 4.1€/tCO2.  This could have created incentives to shift production towards units with higher 
CO2 intensity and also resulted in lower wholesale electricity prices. 
3.2 Updating within an existing trading scheme 
To simplify the presentation, we make the initial assumption that banking is not allowed. If a 
CO2 trading mechanism is already in place, then total emissions E may not exceed the number of 
issued allowances A≥E. We assume positive allowance prices and therefore that the constraint is 
binding: 
)()()( 1+−== tttt pupEcEpA β .      (3) 
 
The impact of updating can be seen by assessing how the equilibrium changes with a change in 
u. Differentiating with respect to u gives (Note, we define 
tt c
EE
p
AA ∂
∂=∂
∂= '' ): 
0
/1
1
1 ≥′′−
∂
∂+
=∂
∂ ++
EA
u
pup
u
p
t
t
t
ββ
      (4) 
 
Increasing the updating factor increases the allowance price by the value of future allowance 
allocation (weakly) and may also increase the value of future allowance allocation from future 
updating. This effect is mitigated if an increased allowance price results in an increase of the total 
amount of allowances in the market A’>0 because E’<0. 
Initially, we assume the total allowed emissions to be fixed (A’=0). Then we explore the 
implications if the A depends on the allowance price. This can happen where flexible mechanisms 
allow for inflow of allowances from outside the EU ETS or from the influence of CO2 allowance 
prices on political negotiations of emission targets. To facilitate this, we retain A’ in the following 
formulae. 
Electricity prices are directly dependent on the opportunity costs of emitting CO2 allowances 
and the qualitative impact of updating on electricity prices can be approximated by the opportunity 
costs of emitting CO2. Differentiating (1) with respect to u and then substituting p’t from (4) gives: 
 
EA
pupEApupp
du
dc tt
ttt
t
′′−
′+′′=−−= ++++ /1/''
11
11
ββββ    (5) 
 
If we assume a one-off updating (e.g. subsequently allowances are expected to be 
auctioned) and no banking then future allowances prices are not affected (p’t+1=0). In this case (5) 
implies that dct/du<=0. While current allowance prices increased with a one-off updating (4), the 
opportunity cost of emitting CO2 is not affected for A’=0 (5). Only if A’>0 and the total amount of 
allowances available within the country increases with allowance prices, can the opportunity cost ct of 
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emitting CO2 decrease with updating (in (5) A’≥0, E<0, pt+1’=0).  In this case electricity prices, which 
in a competitive electricity market also reflect the opportunity cost of allowances, increase by less than 
in an efficient scheme without updating. With A’>0, one-off updating results in a reduction in the 
electricity price pass through of allowance prices. 
The impact of allowance prices on the total quantity of emissions depends on the elasticity of 
total supply: 
EA
pup
A
u
c
E
u
E ttt
′′−
′+′=∂
∂=∂
∂ ++
/1
' 11
ββ
.       (6) 
In general, the impact of updating on total emissions is increasing with elasticity of allowance 
supply A’ (with zero impact at A’=0) and decreasing with the response of production of CO2 to 
opportunity costs of emitting E’. Assuming linear responses and no updating in future periods (p’t+1=0) 
this would imply that total emissions are increased by: 
up
EA
AdE t 1'/'1
'
+−= β .        (7) 
If updating is applied beyond the first commitment period, then in an extreme scenario we 
could assume that it will continue to be applied over allocation periods of 4-5 years. In this case 
updating will not only reduce today’s electricity price but also future electricity prices.  
Assume increasing allowance prices – e.g. due to increasing political awareness or 
intertemporal arbitrage – and for simplicity assume the rate of price increase follows the discount rate 
of generators ( 1+= tt pp β ). Equation (4) turns into:  
EAu
p
u
p tt
′′−−=∂
∂
/1
.        (8) 
In linear approximation of A and E (8) can be given as: 
)'/'1/()'/'1)(0()( EAuEAupup tt −−−==     (9) 
In the extreme case with fixed allowance price, A’->inf. (9) confirms a constant price. In the 
other extreme, with fixed allowance budget, A’=0, updating increases the allowance price by 1/(1-u).  
Substituting into (1) shows (using a first order approximation  in u) 
 
'/'1
'/'1)1)(0(1 EAu
EAuppupc ttt −−
−−=−= +β  
 
Looking again at the extreme case of fixed allowance price (A’->inf.) gives ct(t)=pt(0)(1-u). 
Updating reduces opportunity costs of emitting CO2 and A’>0 results in additional supply of 
allowances.  
In contrast, if A’=0 then ct(t)=pt(0). While allowance prices are inflated with updating, the 
opportunity costs of emitting are not affected because the increased prices of today’s allowances are 
exactly compensated by the increased value of higher priced future allowances received through the 
updating mechanism. This result is restricted to an economy with one sector, because distortions will 
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occur if various sectors or regions can trade allowances, but are exposed to different updating 
mechanisms.  
For , (6) becomes:  0>′A
EAu
pA
u
E t
′′−−′=∂
∂ +
/1
1
β
β
.        (10) 
Comparing (6) and (10) shows, that continuous updating enhances the impact on emissions as 
the denominator is reduced by uβ. The discount factor β relates to discounting between different 
allocation periods and is therefore significantly smaller than 1. Furthermore, u also involves 
consideration of policy uncertainty, in particular whether updating will really occur. Therefore the 
denominator is likely to stay positive and the prices are likely to remain bound. 
3.3 Interaction of updating with banking 
The ETS allows for banking and borrowing of allowances within 2005-2007 and within 2008-
2012. Allowances cannot be transferred between phases. Banking of allowances allows one to smooth 
the price path over annual variations in climate-related energy consumption and business cycles and 
can incentivise for early emission reductions. As allowances are virtual, their banking does not create 
costs other than the opportunity costs of not using the money from selling allowances today. 
Therefore, with intertemporally arbitrage the allowance price is upward sloping with a market related 
interest rate.  
Most market designs prohibit borrowing of future allowances. This implies that the allowance 
price might increase more slowly than the interest rate over time and the inter temporal arbitrage only 
sets a lower bound on today’s price relative to tomorrow’s.  
Updating increases today’s price. Therefore, if there is no saving of allowances in a world 
without updating, there will be no saving after updating is introduced. By contrast, if in a world 
without updating, allowances are saved from period t to period t+1, then the volume of savings will be 
decreased (or eliminated) with updating. 
Assume saving of allowances from period t to period t+1. Then the relationship between prices 
in both periods is determined by the no arbitrage condition: 
pt=β pt+1         (11) 
Banking implies that the emission balance no longer needs to be satisfied on a period by period 
basis, but can be shifted between periods. To simplify the calculations we assume saving only occurs 
in period t: 
A(pt)+A(pt+1)=E(ct)+E(ct+1)       (12) 
Substituting ct from (1): 
At(pt)+At+1(pt+1)=Et(pt-uβpt+1)+Et+1(pt+1), 
using (11): 
At(pt)+At+1(pt/ β)=Et((1-u) pt)+Et+1(pt/ β), 
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and differentiating with respect to u gives: 
( ) ttttt
tt p
EEuAA
E
u
p
11 ''1''
'
++ −−−+
−=∂
∂
ββ
β
 
Assuming linear and constant functions E and A gives: 
( ) tt pEAuu
p
'/'11 βββ
β
+−−+−=∂
∂
     (13) 
The net change in emissions is therefore: 
t
t
t
t
t p
E
A
u
A
u
pA
u
pA
'
'
1
1
1''' 11
−+−
=∂
∂+∂
∂ +
+
β
β       (14) 
Comparing to the case without banking (7), the only difference in the impact on total 
allowances At+At+1is the component -β/(1+ β)u in the nominator. With banking (in the presence of 
saving) updating results in higher emissions. If u is small, the allowance price increase is split between 
period t and period t+1 (compare (13) and (4) and use (11)) such that the net impact on emissions is 
zero: 
ββ +∂
∂=∂
∂=∂
∂
1
1_,1,2,1
u
p
u
p
u
p banknobankbank      (15) 
But if u is larger the increase in pt+1 makes future allowances allocated through updating in 
period t more valuable, and results in additional emissions in period t.  
How is this reflected in the wholesale electricity prices? With one-off updating, the opportunity 
costs of emitting in period t+1 equals the allowance price. Therefore, electricity prices in period t+1 
will increase with the rise in opportunity costs (exact link hinges on system configuration): 
( ) 01
1
_,1,2 >+= ββbanknobank dcdc ,      (16) 
In period one, prices will change according to (1) : 
( ) ββ +−=−= 1
11 _,12,1,1 banknobankbankbank dpudpudpdc .    (17) 
Prices continue to increase, but only by a fraction of the increase observed without banking. The 
(dominant) first order effect with banking is that updating results in a reduction of banking. The 
experience with US SOx  program was that initial reductions in emissions were motivated by the 
opportunity to bank allowances. Updating might eliminate incentives to perform early emission 
reductions. Empirical analysis of allowance markets should therefore also consider whether a 
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counterfactual without updating would have resulted in increased banking patterns and increased 
emission reductions.  
4. Investment decisions and new entry/exit allocations 
We now consider the incentives relating to new investment. Most EU governments have created 
‘new entrant reserves’, a special pool of allowances available (usually for free) to cover emissions 
from new facilities that enter during the scheme’s operation. The idea is to facilitate competition by 
lowering barriers to entry. However, new entrant allocation may distort the deployment of new low 
CO2 technologies. Governments have also differed in their treatment of exit – whether, or for how 
long, facilities that close retain their emission allowances.  
Specifically, we want to consider: 
• impact of new entrant allocation on total installed capacity; 
• impact of new entrant allocation on technology choice; and, 
• impact of conditional allocation on closure decisions of power plants. 
Investment is required to replace old plants and satisfy demand growth. The quantity of 
investment in a competitive market is determined such that the marginal invested unit of each 
technology makes zero expected profit.  
We start by assessing an electricity system with only one generation technology, then move to a 
system with two technologies, and finally discuss how barriers to entry and investment risk impact the 
validity of these assumptions. 
4.1 New entrant allocation - one technology 
Consider deploying a new power generation unit with no lifetime limit. The net electricity sales  
is the revenue from selling electricity minus fuel costs pelec,t. The cost of emitting CO2 will be the 
product of the emissions per unit of production λ and the opportunity costs of allowances c. With new 
entry allocation, the new unit will receive a fixed number of allowances μ at their traded price p. 
Finally we have to consider the fixed costs per unit of production . The profits of the marginal new 
entrant will be: 
fc
( ) felec
t
t cpcp −+−= ∑∞
=
μλβπ
0
.      (18) 
We assume that demand for electricity is growing in every period such that new entry is 
required. With no significant barriers to entry (18) is therefore satisfied when π=0. With continuous 
updating, the price stays constant and the opportunity costs of allowances equals today’s price minus 
the discounted value of free allocation of tomorrow: c=(1-uβ)p. Substituting into (18) and using 
ββ −=∑
∞
= 1
1
0t
t gives: 
.)1())(1( felec cpup βμβμ −+−−−=      (19) 
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Allowances A in the market have to equal total emissions.  With one technology, total emissions 
will be equal to the demand for electricity D(pelec) multiplied by the emission production factor λ such 
that: 
)()( pApD elec =λ .        (20) 
Substituting (19) in (20) and differentiating with respect to the new entrance allocation μ shows 
how the allowance price changes with increasing new entrance allocation (where 
0' <∂∂= elecpDD ): 
p
DAu
p
)'/(')(1
1
λμβμ
β
μ −−−−
+=∂
∂ .     (21) 
Equation (21) shows that increasing μ will lead to an increase in p.  Note that sum of free 
allocation μ and updating u is limited by the allowance budget, otherwise the denominator of (21) 
could turn zero. How will this feed through to the electricity price?  If the allowance budget is fixed 
then, by (20), the amount of electricity that can be produced is fixed and therefore we can conclude 
that the electricity price will not be affected by the new entrant allocation.  The up-front payment to 
new investors will be exactly offset by an increase in the allowance price and therefore future emission 
costs. 
The situation is a little different if the allowance budget is increasing with increasing 
allowance price.  In that case, A’>0, and whilst (21) shows that μ∂∂p  would still be positive, the 
influence of new entrant allocation on allowance prices will be lower than in the case with a fixed 
emissions cap (A’=0).  As the allowance prices increase gives rise to an increase in A, for (20) to hold, 
electricity production will also rise. Higher electricity production requires higher electricity demand – 
and therefore the equilibrium electricity price is lower:  
0' <∂
∂=∂
∂
μλμ
p
Dl
Apelec   
4.2 New entrant allocation - two technologies 
Assume demand is satisfied with two different technologies. In equilibrium the marginal unit of 
each technology breaks even (π=0). To simplify the analysis we ignore updating and therefore set 
opportunity costs c of emissions equal to emission prices p. This also allows us to ignore the role of 
time and assume a one-off equilibrium decision.  
Assume two technologies with fixed annual costs , marginal costs ,  emissions ifc , imc , 2CO iλ , 
and installed capacity . Assume demand is uniformly distributed between  and . For 
simplicity we assume that if ∑  then the price will rise to the price at which demand 
side response is assumed to set in at price p
iK minD maxD
< DKi maxp
max. 
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Let’s assume technology one has lower marginal costs than technology two, 
cccc mm 22,11, λλ +<+ , and therefore technology 1 is dispatched first. Furthermore, let’s normalise 
 and assume01, =mc 01 =λ . Therefore, the average price over the year is: 
)()( 22,2maxmax ccKpKDp miav λ++−= ∑ .    (22) 
Technology 1 is always running when prices exceed zero.  Therefore, its average revenue equals 
the average price (the period of the year is normalised to 1 and so is )12 DD − . Its annual profits can 
be written as: 
1,22,2maxmax1 )()( fmi cccKpKD −++−= ∑ λπ .    (23) 
Technology 2 recovers its fixed costs during the period when prices reach the price cap. Its 
annual profits are therefore: 
2,22,maxmax2 ))(( fmi ccccpKD −+−−−= ∑ μλπ .   (24) 
In equilibrium the marginal unit of both technologies makes zero profits, 0=iπ . This allows 
us to calculate changes to the equilibrium level of installed capacity of both technologies. 
An increase in the free allocation μ in (24) shows that 0/2 >∂∂ μπ . Therefore, an increase in μ 
results in the construction of new generation capacity of type 2 and 0/2 >∂∂ μK .  This shows that 
new entrant allocation can bias the investment decision towards the more carbon intensive 
technologies. 
How is total installed capacity K1+K2 affected? Differentiating (23) with respect to μ gives: 
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max
2222, )(2
p
KccK
c
m
K
i μμ λλ
μ
∂
∂
∂
∂ ++=∂
∂∑ .     (25) 
 
The first part of the nominator of (25) is positive and the second part negative.  Therefore, we need to 
take a view on μ∂∂c  to assess the net impact of the new entrant allocation. Assuming that the total 
number of allowances is again elastic (A’>0), then: 
)()( 1max22 KDKcA −= λ .       (26) 
Differentiating with respect to μ gives: 
'
)( 1max2
2 A
KDKc −=∂
∂ ∂∂μλμ .       (27) 
Substituting (27) in (25) gives: 
cA
K
cA
KKD
mi
p
KccKK
∂∂
∂∂
−+
+
++
∂
∂=∂
∂∑
/max
/
2
2222,2
2
2
2
2
12max
λ
λλ
μμ .    (28) 
The term at the right hand side of (28) is positive, therefore free allocation to the emitting 
technology will not only shift investment towards this technology but also result in a net increase of 
emissions. 
4.3 Contingent allocation 
Allocation of CO2 allowances in some countries requires that the power station remains 
operational or even operates for a minimum number of hours per year.  This differs from the US NOx 
and SOx programs that provided for unconditional allocation based only on the reference period. If the 
allocation is contingent on the availability of a power station, then an operator will be prepared to pay 
annual variable and fixed costs up to the value of the free allocation. This implies that more old power 
stations will stay online. The additional capacity reduces the scarcity value of capacity and therefore 
electricity prices. Contingent allocation has the same implications as the free new entrant allocation 
discussed in the previous section.  
With contingent allocation the power price is reduced so electricity consumption is increased. In 
the absence of contingent allocation some of the unprofitable power stations might have been replaced 
by new build power stations. This would have resulted in more efficient production. Both effects 
imply that contingent allocation increases CO2 emissions. 
If a national allocation not only requires availability as a condition for the allowance allocation, 
but requires that a power station runs a minimum number of hours during the period, then the operator 
will run the power station even if the marginal costs exceed the wholesale price, so long as the 
incurred loss is less than the value of the allowances retained. It has the same implications as the 
previous mechanisms.  
While some countries have specified conditional allocation within a national allocation plan, no 
country has committed to totally unconditional allocation for the first Kyoto period. Even if the 
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Commission or Member States were to confirm that current emissions are not part of the reference 
period to quantify CO2 allowance allocation for the first Kyoto period, power station operators might 
expect that they have to keep their power stations available until the allocation is confirmed to benefit 
from the allocation. This provides an additional component of conditional allocation. 
5. Summary analytic results 
Table 2 summarises the analytic results for the different cases. It shows that in all those cases 
that have been analysed, updating and new entrant allocation will increase the allowance price E and 
will decrease the opportunity costs, which generators face for emitting CO2. Lower opportunity costs 
will result in lower wholesale market prices. 
-2
-1
+1
+1
+1,2
+New entrant alloc 1 tech
+1+New entrant alloc. 2 tech
+ +1+Continuous updating
+2 -1+1+One-off updating
-+Initial updating 
1 Only with flexible allowance budget (A’>0) +  increased by allocation
2 Only with banking - reduced by allocation
-1
Allowance
price   (p)
Emissions
(E)
Opportunity
costs   (c)
base
period
next
period
base
period
next
period
base
period
next
period
-1
 
Table 2 Distortions caused by different allocation mechanisms  
If an increase of the allowance price results in an increase of the number of allowances in the 
market, then all analysed cases of updating and new entrant allocation will result in an increase of 
aggregate emissions.  
As allocation mechanisms vary, the extent to which allowance prices will be inflated will also 
vary between countries and sectors. This can create additional distortions, as illustrated by the 
following example. Imagine two symmetrical regions. Symmetry would suggest that both regions 
achieve the same emission reductions and we observe the same allowance prices in both regions. If 
updating inflates allowance prices in region A, then trade between the regions would imply that 
allowances are sold from region B to region A until prices are arbitraged. This implies that additional 
emission reductions are achieved in region B and lower reductions are achieved in region A. As the 
efficient solution would have been symmetric reductions the asymmetric updating of tradable 
allowances resulted in an inefficient solution. 
 16
 6. Numerical implications 
To support the analytical analysis we have used a dispatch model of the UK power system.  For 
this purpose we have used the Integrated Planning Model (IPM®), developed by ICF Consulting. It is a 
linear optimisation formulation and selects investment options and dispatches generation and load 
management resources to meet overall electric demand today and on an ongoing basis over the chosen 
planning horizon.7
We expand the model such that it can calculate the equilibrium for a market with updating. 
Changes in other environmental regulation, in particular the large combustion plant directive covering 
SOx and NOx also have significant implications for the profitability of power plants. We do not 
activate this option during the runs such that the pure effect of CO2 constraints can be better 
interpreted. Table 3 shows the CO2 allowance prices which are determined exogenously. This reflects 
either the limited impact of one country on the European allowance prices or the aspect that 
government policy determines CO2 emission reduction targets to achieve effective but not too 
expensive CO2 allowance prices. 
Year 2005-2007 2008-2012 2013-2017 2018-
Euro/tCO2 10 15 15 20 
Table 3 Allowance prices in base case 
In the model runs gas price are assumed to start at 5.20 Euro/MMBtu in 2005 and drop to 4.10 
Euro/MMBtu by 2020.  Coal price start at 2.66 Euro/MMBtu in 2005 and drop to 2.25 Euro/MMBtu 
by 2020. 
Figure 3 shows that implementing CO2 constraints increased the “all-in” power price from the 
case without CO2 emission constraints to the base case. With updating a power station emitting one 
additional unit of CO2 will receive 0.7 units of additional allowances in the following period.  This 
significantly reduces opportunity costs of CO2 emissions and results in only half the increase of power 
prices from CO2 constraints. 
If new entrants obtain CO2 allowances in their first period of existing (NER), then new power 
plants require less additional revenue from scarcity prices (e.g. capacity payments) to break even and 
the equilibrium power price falls.  
                                                     
7 For further information on the IPM® and use of the model by the US Environmental Protection Agency’s refer 
to http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/epa-ipm/. 
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Figure 3 Price reflects energy-weighted average wholesale power price across UK 
Figure 4 shows, that the CO2 constraints in the base case results in large amounts of new 
investment in CCGT to replace coal stations. With updating the opportunity costs of CO2 emissions 
are reduced and hence more old power stations continues to run, reducing the dash for gas. 
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Figure 4 Cumulative installed capacity in CCGT and retired capacity in base case 
The figure also indicates that due to updating the opportunity to obtain future allocation based 
on today’s emission prevents the retirement of plants.  
Finally, Figure 5 illustrates how total emissions change in all three scenarios. Updating reduces 
the impact of ETS by 50%.  
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Figure 5 Total CO2 emissions in the UK power sector base case 
New entrant allocation increases the effectiveness of ETS. The new entrant allocation supports 
the earlier construction of CCGT and hence a shift from coal to gas production. This dynamic impact 
is not reflected in the equilibrium analysis in section 4, which predicted a more CO2 intensive 
technology mix as a result of new entrant allocations of CO2 allowances. A possible explanation for 
this is that we are in a dynamic environment – and dynamic effects have to be assessed in the 
transition period. But at the same time, the dynamic effects predicted by a numerical model can be 
sensitive to model assumptions. In our choice of technology costs and fuel prices only CCGT power 
stations are competitive. With higher CO2 prices or higher gas prices this might no longer hold, and 
then the new entrant allocation might prevent or reduce the investment in lower CO2 technologies 
instead of CCGT or might result in the construction of more CO2 intensive coal power stations instead 
of CCGT. 
Figure 6 shows the CO2 emissions at twice the allowance prices from the base case in Table 3. 
They result in a shift of the merit order and therefore there are already emission reductions in 2005-
2007 that were not observed in the base case.  
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Figure 6 Total CO2 emissions in the UK power sector – double CO2 prices 
Figure 7 illustrates that the higher CO2 prices also induce earlier retirement of coal plants and 
construction of CCGT plants. 
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Figure 7 Cumulative installed capacity in CCGT and retired capacity, double CO2 price 
However, the final emission volume in 2018-2022 is only reduced by 10% from 146 Mio. t CO2 in the 
base case to 126 Mio t CO2 in the case with double the CO2 prices. It is not surprising that the impact 
is so small, as coal based generation in 2018-2022 is already in the base case reduced to 15% of 
today’s level such that more CCGT with higher CO2 prices allows only limited additional emission 
reductions. What would be required are CO2 free technologies, like renewables. To focus on the CO2 
allocation we only implemented a 10.6 GW of renewables deployment by 2020 which stayed constant 
in all scenarios.  
The updating factor we apply in the model is likely to be at the high end. Figure 8 shows the 
impact on prices if a unit of emission only provides 0.35 additional free allowances in the subsequent 
period, instead of 0.7 as in the previous example.  
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Figure 8 All in power prices for different levels of updating, base case CO2 price 
Electricity prices reduce approximately linear with the updating factor. In our model this 
relationship is also observed for the CO2 emissions and for the volume of new build CCGT. However, 
the retirement stays at less than 10% of the volume observed in the base case even if the updating 
factor is halved. This shows the existence of trigger levels. 
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The numerical model showed that all allocation provisions of the ETS reduce the wholesale 
electricity price compared to the price observed if allowances were grandfathered or auctioned.  
Updating provisions delay a shift in the merit order, investment in less CO2 intensive CCGT and 
hence CO2 emission reductions. With updating or no-closure conditions most CO2 intensive power 
stations are retained on the system.  
The new entrant allocation illustrates the value of combining analytic and numeric results. The 
simulation shows that new entrant allocation accelerates the investment into lower CO2 intensive 
CCGT plants resulting in earlier CO2 emission reductions. This positive dynamic effect could be out 
weight if new entrant allocation distorts the technology choice for new investment, e.g. biases towards 
coal instead of gas or gas instead of renewables. In the simulation the bias introduced was smaller than 
the cost differences between coal, gas and renewable technologies and did therefore not affect 
technology choice. But this is not true for all fuel, CO2 allowance and technology price assumptions.  
7. Elasticity of Allowance supply - Linking Mechanisms 
The ability to offer ‘new entrant’ allocations is one very specific and narrow aspect of a broader 
property of the EU ETS, namely that it is a partially open system: the total number of allowances in 
the trading market is not fixed, but is conditional both within any period, and in future periods.  
Within the present (2005-7) period, the total number of allowances available is affected by (i) 
new entrants, as discussed, and (ii) by the import of ‘emission credits’ through the Kyoto Protocol’s 
project mechanisms, specifically the Clean Development Mechanism that allows generation of credits 
from emission-reducing projects in developing countries.  
In the next (Kyoto CP1) phase, each Member State has a cap on total national emissions, the 
openness of the EU ETS itself increases further. At the stage of allocation, the total available to the 
EU ETS facilities can be changed through:  
(1) countries can shift internal allocation from the non-covered sector to the covered sector; 
(2) Member States can choose to buy Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) from Joint 
Implementation (JI) projects and Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects; 
(3) Member States could purchase allowances directly from other industrialised countries, notably 
the surplus available in potentially very large amounts from Russia and Ukraine (known as 
“hot air” trading). 
 
In addition, at the stage of operation, the number of allowances in the EU can be increased by 
company purchases of ERUs and CERs. Thus, the aggregate quantity of emission certificates available 
to EU ETS market participants is a function of the CO2 price: 
• in the first period because that may affect the total that Member States are willing to allocate 
to their capped sectors in the Kyoto period; 
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• in the second (Kyoto) period, when the price will determine the level of emission credit 
imports. 
 
In principle, Kyoto’s project mechanisms generate emission credits only when they offer 
additional emission savings, and thus represent a geographical displacement of the emission reduction 
effort; as long as an increased allowance price only results in an increase of JI and CDM projects, 
there will be no global net effect on CO2 concentrations.   
However, current analysis suggests that Russia and the Ukraine have excess AAUs that exceed 
the demand of the remaining Kyoto member states (excluding the US). Any increased use of these 
AAUs will result in a net increase of global CO2 emissions. To the extent that allowances are 
purchased from countries with ‘Hot Air’, this does not involve any corresponding emission reductions 
(and the governance of ERU transfers from such countries may be similarly weak). Such trades may 
increase overall global emissions.  
A third mechanism, through which higher CO2 allowance prices can result in higher global CO2 
emissions are the negotiations for future reduction targets. If national governments assess the 
economic implications of CO2 constraints based on the CO2 allowance prices, then inflated CO2 prices 
will reduce the motivation for national governments to negotiate more stringent reduction targets.   
A final displacement effect may arise if multinational energy intensive industries change their 
production patterns to produce more from outside the EU ETS zone, or if industries relocate facilities, 
or import more from outside the EU ETS zone. Indeed if such production is at facilities that are less 
efficient than those in the EU, this could lead to a net increase.  
In a subsequent paper, we will explore the impact of the essential openness of the EU ETS on 
the overall emission incentive effect of the EU ETS.  
8. Conclusion 
Our analysis shows that CO2 allowances allocation mechanisms used in the European Union’s 
Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) distorts electricity prices. If tomorrow’s allocation can be influenced 
by today’s CO2 emissions, this can create a wedge between allowance prices and opportunity costs. 
Allowance prices can be inflated above the level they would take in a cap-and-trade program with pure 
auctioning of allowances or one-off allocation based on historic emissions. This inflation can distort 
inter-sectoral, international and inter-temporal production and emission reduction decisions.  
With this form of updating, the opportunity costs for CO2 emissions can be reduced not only 
below the allowance price but below the efficient allowance price. As a result final electricity prices 
may not reflect the environmental externality inducing excessive consumption and limiting the 
attractiveness of energy efficiency programmes.  
The new entrant allocation can furthermore distort the technology choice for new power plants 
away from less CO2 intensive plants towards more CO2 intensive technologies. 
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